rhan a bir for luck would give an annual increme ntal cosr of, say,
$48,000: hardly eno ugh ro recruit, pay and administer a civilian TA.
I have belabored rhis point because I believe ir is chimerical.
T he ofT-repeated assertion rhar military T As are mo re expensive is
demonstrably incorrect, no marrer who is paying. One simply can nor
exrrapolare from rhe per capita incremenral cosr of a fu ll-scale military
operation, or even per capita incremenral cosr of "borrowing" soldiers
from visiting military forces, ro rhe incremental cosr of deploying an
unarmed military TA wirh no logistics, communicatio ns o r infrastructure support beyond rhar which would also be provided to a civilian
TA. While debates over rhe relative quality of military and civilian TAs
cannot be conclusively settled because borh groups arc comprised of
individuals whose abilities vary widely, cost is a quantitative issue char
can be eliminated from the debate altogether.

Philosophy
If we accept rhar rhe question of abiliry is ar least sci II open
and char rhe question of money has been addressed, we are le fr wirh
philosophical argumenrs. This aspecr of che debare is a relarivcly fa inr
echo of rhe ongoing concroversy over rhe role of military forces in
humanitarian operations, and of rhe ofr-cxaggerared "culwral" differences between milirary and civilian personnel. A key elemenr of chis
w ider conrroversy-rhe abiliry of milicary personnel ro carry our
humanitarian rasks- has already been addressed in rhis arricle.
Anorher concern is related ro security. This argumenr suggests char humanitarian workers may be endangered because bell igerenrs won' t be able ro disti ngu ish between military and civilian pe rsonnel who are engaged in similar work, or because humani tarian workers
may become cargers by virrue of association with the mil itary.
However, attacks o n humanitarian workers (such as chose char have
taken place in Afghanistan) are nor carried o ur because of confusion
over rhe mili rary or civilian status of rhe victims, or because of a perceived rainr due ro civil-m ilirary cooperation; rhcy arc carried o ur
because rhe arrackers w ish ro drive away humanitarian workers.
The lasr philosophical argumcnr can be summarized as "lr
isn' t rheir busi ness," with a subrexr rhar rhe rnilirary is only interested
in humanitarian mine acrion because rhey are looking for gainful
employment in orde r ro jusrify rheir existence. In response ro rhe firsr
point I would suggest thar ir's the business of anyone who can make an
cfTecrivc conrriburion ro rhe efTorr, and rhar the only " turf' we should
be concerned about is rhar concealing rhe mines. As for the second
po inr, rhe armies char normally provide TAs seem robe busy e no ugh
these days. Furthermore, in rhe smaller armies, mi litary TAs are drawn
from a numerically small pool, and chose arm ies are ofren less rhan
anxious ro send scarce officers and non-commissio ned officers (NCOs)
ofT ro do work rhac they feel is nor che military's business!

Conclusion
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Altho ugh relarive qualiry is difficult co assess, the average
abil iry of m ili tary TAs is o n par wirh rhe resr of rhe humani tarian mine
action community and che fina ncial and p hilosophical argumenrs
against their use do nor srand up ro examination. Military TA~ are a
useful and usable resource, and since it would be srarding indeed co
hear a m ine acrion manager complain of a surfeit of resources, I must
conclude-as promised- char humanitarian m ine actio n benefirs fro m

the use of military TAs.
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Use of

BELGIAN MILITARY EXPERTS
For many years, a large debate over the use of military
experts in humanitarian demining has existed. Some individuals
are against military demining arguing the military performs different techniques and holds different priorities from humanitarian demining. Others are favourable toward military demining, as
they are the majority of demining centres. The Belgian military
has been active in demining since World War I (WWI). Still
today, explosive remnants from WWI and World War II (WWII)
remain a daily concern in the life of Belgians. The minefields
have been cleared for many years, yet everyday military experts
still dispose of UXO or abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). It
is important to understand this process does not take place during a military operation. Rather it is placed within the framework
of helping the population, a type of humanitarian demining.
Hi1tory
The explosive o rdnance disposal
(EOD) service was created immediately after
WWl. This service was acrive throughout
Belgium, initially as a decachmenr ro each
Provincial Recovery Service. In I 922, many
landmines we re disposed of, givi ng th e
impression ic would only take a few months ro
complere che project. Unfortunately, it
became clear rhe UXO problem was far from
over. In an effort to cackle this issue, rhe
O rdnance Disposal Service was created o n
Octo ber 3, I 923 .
After WWII , numerous Belgian
m ilitary unirs were directed ro dispose of the
obstacles and m ines la id in bo th world wars.
T hese unirs were sent rhroughour Belgi um.
On August 16, 1941 , rhe EOD service was
recreated, afrer rhe captive pe rsonnel were
freed , ro dispose of all explosive devices and

preserve any d evices of military importance.
Bomb d isposal reams quickly formed in rowns
char suffe red from bo mbing during the wars
and in places where old minefields, ammunition dumps or explosive charges were discovered. The EOD service activities conrinually
exceeded rhe casks emrusred ro ir by staying in
constant conracr with several resistance groups
and wirh allies. Through this constant interaction, EOD was able to inform London of p ossible manu facturing errors in fusing sysccms
and of likely causes of non-exploding bombs.
The bo mb disposal experts also recovered
explosives of defused devices and passed o n
rhe remaining explosive fille rs to resistance
groups for sabotage purposes.
On Ocrobe r 16, 1944, the
Explosive O rdnance and Obscacle Disposal
Service was creared as a n official addicio n ro
rhe EO D service and Belgian Armed Forces.
In the first year, 300 men worked under chis
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in EOD
servtcc. The Explosive Ordnance D isposal
Service was created on December I , 1945, ro
unite a ll exisring bomb disposal un its under
one single command.
Between 1944 and 1948, rhe EOD
service srrucrure changed co nstantly as
Belgium search for an ideal organ ization and
due ro rhc Bomb Disposal Unir consran rly
decreasing inside. Likewise, afrer WWll, rhe
authorities believed an EOD service was no
longer necessary. The abolition of rhis service
was again imminenr. However, on July 4,
I947, a d ifferent decision was made-ro
reduce irs srrengrh ro 42 men. Fortunately chis
decision was never broughr ro execution , and
by rhe end of 1948, rhe EOD service consisted of 350 me n. T he Explosive Ordnance and
Obsracle Disposal Service held a temporary
unir sraws unril May I, 1948, whe n ic became
an organization of the basic Armed Forces.
Between I 949 and I 955, rhe EOD service saw
ma ny changes, essenrially as a resulc of che
reorgani7.-ation of rhe Armed Forces. Ar the
e nd of 1955, rhe EOD service had decreased
ro 11 5 personnel.
In O ctober 1971 , the army dete rmined rhe EOD service would no lo nger be an
independent unit. However, the early 1970s
consisted of inrernacional terrorism, which
meanr a need for Belgian specialists capable of
d isposing booby traps, letter bombs, car
bombs, etc. Furthermore, rhe number of leftover munirions from the two world wars
exceed ed the previous estimates. Each year,
ch e EOD service received 3,000-4,000
req uests ro dispose of devices of all kinds. Less
rha n three years after its dissolution rhe EOD
service was again creared on August I, 1974.
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The
I mer-service
Territorial
Command (lTC) was fou nded in 1995 d ue ro
a general reorgan isation of the armed forces.
lTC was established to bring together all
bomb disposal units in charge of territorial
bomb disposal operations under one command. This was the last major change for the
EOD unit.

CurrCIInt ActivHiC118
Today rhe Belgian bomb disposal
battalion comprises 23 officers, 151 non-commissioned officers (NCOs) , and 13 1 corpo rals
and civil ians, rhus a total of 305 personnel of
which 172 are bomb disposal experts ( 16 officers, I 00 NCOs and 56 corporals). The battalion is composed of three com panies decentral ised to cover the all-national territory.
T he first task of the unit is the
clearance of UXO and AXO left in Belgium
from the two world wars. Despite rhe proposal to d issolve the unit in 1971,
.u r' ~ 1
I .,lit t't un ~ 1 \ .u r;n gi ug
1 I 1 ''
1:1 ,, HI~' w 1 nr.h hnmb~ up w '\1 I kgn
rnon.:

Consequently, the battalion handles a11 average of 250 tons of ammunition
every year. Some 20 tons of "problem ammuni tion" (suspected chemical ammuni tion) are
recovered each year, especially in the areas of
fighting during WWI.
The Battalion's second mission is
rhe dismantling of roxie and chemical ammunitio n dari ng from WWI. The disma ntling
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facil ity is located at the sire of conflict during
WWI. During 1998 and 1999, tests were carried o ut o n real ammunition ro control the
feasibility of rhe installation. The installation
has been opera tional since October 1999.
The third major task calls for the
support o f juridical autho ri ties in rhe field of
terrorism and organised crime. This responsibility averages around 150 interventions a year
fo r the EOD Battalion . Suspect devices ranging fro m letter bombs to car bombs arc investigated and rendered safe. The unit is also in
charge of post-explosion investigations. The
EOD Battalion is always ready ro intervene in
case of a military air crash to recover ammunition and pyrotechn ic elements. It can also rely
o n diver-bomb disposal expens for diving missions in the hinterland and the territorial
water su rfaces.
T he un it instructs its own bomb
d isposal experts and organises insrructional
courses fo r police forces, juridical authorities
and securi ty agents. The basic course to
become an EOD operator cakes one year.
After five years of experience, the no n-com missioned EOD officer operator follows an
advanced four- monrh course. Then the NCO
can act as an EOD ream leader. In 2003, the
Ministry of Defence requested char the bomb
disposal school develop an EOD ream leader
course for foreigners to parricipare in. T his
four-month course is available to experienced
EOD operators.
Belgian military experts continually
advise researchers involved in programs to
support humani tarian demining. Regularly,

rhe EOD operators su pport Belgian universities, the Royal Military Academy and many
civilia n universities in their studies with the
h umanitarian demining domain. The EOD
experts constandy rest new equipment and
p rovide help to the students, based on their
field experience.
The last support provided by the
Belgian military experrs encompasses the technical assistance to treaty and protocol d evelopment. Belgian Defence sends mil itary experrs
and both EOD and non-EOD operarors to
inrernariona l workshops and symposiums.
During these development processes, the military experts can provide counsel to developing treaties and protocol based on thei r field
experiences.
Beginning in 1990, Belgium began
requesting UN support fo r its humanitarian
activities and inform ing the world of irs 70
years of lessons learned.
Thus, the EO D Barralion began
participating in operations abroad. One mission called for the protection of thei r own
Belgian troops du ring deployments abroad.
Others were conducted within the framework
of humani tarian demining. Numerous un its
senr EOD experts to Rwanda (1986, 19931994), Iraq ( 199 1), Fo rmer Yugoslavia
( 1992- today), Somalia (1992-1993),
Cambod ia
(1994-today),
Democratic
Republic of the Congo (1997, 2004), Lao
People's Demo-cratic Republic (PDR)
( 1998-coday), Albania ( 1999) and Benin
(200 1).

The Battalion currendy has the following 13
EOD operators abroad:
• Three military EOD operators
are stationed in Kosovo to protect Belgian
troops, yet the Belgian EOD operators deal
daily with UXO in civiJian areas.
• Four military operators EOD
experts are stationed in Cambodia as technical advisers for the Cambodian Mine
Action Centre (CMAC). Between 1994 and
1996, the Belgian experts were involved in
the minefields. Their main task was to
inform and advise, in the field, the CMAC
deminers. Between 1996 and 2000, the
advisers assisted in the creation of an EOD
branch in CMAC with the cooperation of
Dutch colleagues. Since 2000, the Belgian
advisers have been alone in the support of
a n EOD branch. The statistics of C ambodia
show that 65 percent of the accidents are
due to UXO and 35 percent are due to AP
mines. The intention of CMAC is to build
an EOD branch able to work throughout
the country.
• Two military EOD experts are
deployed in the southern province of Lao,
C hampassak, in support of the activities of
the Lao National UXO Project (UXO
lAO). The BeJgian advisers support all the
domains, not only the technical and operational, but also human resources, material
resources, finance, etc. Since 1998, Belgium
has provided technical advisers to assist the
operations in the province. During the 15
years of war, bombs were dropped on Lao
PDR. Today it is a country covered with
tons of UXO. The experience gained in
Belgium since 1918 gives Belgium a good
opportunity to help Lao PDR to build a
long-term UXO disposal capacity to reduce
the risk due to unexploded bomb live units
(BLUs), bombs and other UXO.
• Four EOD operators have been

deployed in Bosnia since November 2003
to reinforce the Stabilization Force (SFOR)
mission. The mission of this team is to
assist Bosnia in the storage, transportation
and demolition of large stocks of ammunition.
Following the past experiences of
Belgium 's use of military experrs in human itarian demining has an advantage, even if the
humanitarian demin ing is normally nor a military mission. When a country uses mil itary
experts to build a national EOD capacity to
clear the country, the costs are substantially
lower. The majority of arm ies with an EOD
capacity developed them to support military
operations. During peaceful rimes, this capacity is available and the operators can be used to
clear the UXO on the national territory. The
country does not need to pay twice to develop
an EOD capacity for military operarions and
an EOD capacity for national territory. lr is
also evident that the experience gained on rhc
nationa l territory can also be used to support
programs abroad.
Military expcrrs usually have a mi lirary channel rhar gives them access to techn ical information. Thus, when the military
experts are involved in support of the humanitarian demining, it is easier ro ger access ro
rhe needed rechn ical informacion . Directly
after a conflict, milita•y units are regularly sent
to control the peace process. T he miliraty
EOD operators are able to starr wirh the
urgcnr clearance operations and disposal of
UXO. The co-operation with other actors will
only provide benefits to rhe humanitarian siruarion. A better coordination between military experts and non-military expertS is also an
advantage for research and development of
mine action technologies with a reduction of
the costs and an increase in the researchers
involved.

In conclusion, AP mines are a problem, bur they are unfortunately not d1e only
problem after a conflict. Many statistics
demonstrate today char UXO represent an
important problem rhar may be larger than
the AP mine problem. The experience of
Belgium shows that many decades after the
end of the hostilities, large quantities of UXO

still remain on the ground. The demin ing
acriviries of mincfields and rhe disposal of
UXO arc major tasks rhar will rake a long
rime. lr is in the interest of the inrernario nal
community to rake into accounr all available
resources, included military o perators. They
perform the same job as the no n-military
operators with, in some cases, other priorities
and other time schedules.
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